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Proper Standard for Enforcing an Internal Revenue Service Section 7602 Sum-
mons: United States v. LaSalle National Bank' —In May, 1975, John F. Oliv-
ero, a special agent with the Intelligence Division of the Chicago District of
the Internal Revenue Service, was assigned to investigate the tax liability of
John Gattuso for the 1970-1972 tax years. 2
 Gattuso's tax returns for the
years under investigation disclosed rental income from real estate, 3 held in
Illinois land trusts by respondent LaSalle National Bank as trustee for Gat-
tuso. 4
 To determine the accuracy of Gattuso's income reports, Agent Olivero
issued two summonses to the bank pursuant to section 7602 of the Internal
Revenue Code. 5
 The summonses, each relating to different land trusts, di-
rected the bank, as trustee, to appear before Olivero and to produce all rec-
1 98 S. Ct. 2357 (1978).
2 Id. at 2359. Olivero requested the assignment, which he pursued without
the assistance of a revenue agent, after having solicited and received information from
various departments and agencies—including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, the Secret Service, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the IRS Collection Division, and
Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago. Id.
The functions of revenue agents and special agents—and the departments to
which they are assigned—differ. Special agents, through the Intelligence Division en-
force the criminal statutes applicable to income, estate, gift, employment, and excise
tax laws (except those relating to alochol, tobacco, narcotics and certain' firearms), by
developing information concerning alleged criminal violations thereof, evaluating alle-
gations and indications of such violations to determine investigations to be undertaken,
investigating suspected criminal violations of such laws, recommending prosecution
when warranted, and measuring effectiveness of the investigation and prosecution
processes. Internal Revenue Service Organization and Functions § 1118.6, 39 Fed.
Reg. 11,607 (1974).
In contrast, revenue agents, operating in the Audit Division, conduct a program
involving the classification of returns for field and office audits, the conduct of district
conferences in unagreed cases, and participation with special agents in the conduct of
tax fraud investigations, and are responsible for providing manpower for the annual
overseas taxpayer compliance program. Id. at § 1113.563, 39 Fed. Reg. 11,581 (1974).
Thus, the Intelligence Division focuses solely on criminal violations while the Audit
Division is primarily concerned with civil liability.
The Intelligence and Audit Divisions have now been redesignated as the Criminal
Enforcement Division and the Examination Division, respectively. IRS News Release,
February 6, 1978.
3
 98 S. Ct. at 2359.
4 Id.
5 Id. I.R.C. § 7602 provides:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a
return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person
for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any trans-
feree or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or
collecting any such liability, the Secretary is authorized—
(1) To examine any books, papers, records or other data which
may be relevant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform
the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person hav-
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ords relating to the trusts for the period from 1970 through 1972. 6 Joseph
W. Lang, a bank vice-president, appeared in response to the summonses, but on
advice of counsel, refused to produce any of the material requested.'
The United States and Agent Olivero sought to enforce the summonses
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.' Act-
ing upon the petition for enforcement, the district court entered an order to
show cause for denying the enforcement of the summonses.' At the sub-
sequent hearing, respondents argued that Olivero's investigation was "purely
criminal" in nature, and that the summonses were unenforceable because is-
sued for a purpose—criminal investigation—unauthorized by section 7602. 10
In this regard, respondents contended that they did not have to show that the
summonses lacked a civil purpose." The district court agreed with respon-
dents' arguments, and held that a section 7602 summons issued solely for the
purpose of obtaining evidence of criminal conduct was not issued in good
faith pursuit of a purpose authorized by section 7602. Accordingly, the court
denied enforcement of Olivero's summonses." Although an IRS summons
might properly unearth evidence of criminal conduct—if issued in good faith
and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution—the district court
maintained that an IRS summons issued solely to discover criminal conduct
would be improper. Relying heavily on the personal motive of Special Agent
Olivero," the court found that the respondents had met their burden of
ing possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries
relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to per-
form the act, or any other person the Secretary may deem proper, to
appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named
in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records or other
data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or
material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath,
as may be relevant or material to such inquiry.
" 98 S. Ct. at 2360.
7 Id.
8 Id. The petition, filed pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 7402(b) and 7604(a), alleged the
necessity of requested materials to determine Gattuso's tax liability for the years in
question, and that the petitioner did not possess the information requested. At the
filing, Olivero testified that he had not as yet determined whether criminal charges
were warranted nor had he issued a report or made a recommendation about the case
to his superiors. Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. This argument was based upon Olivero's alleged comment to respon-
dents' counsel in June 1975 that the Gattuso investigation "was strictly related to crim-
inal violations of the Internal Revenue Code." Id. At the hearing, Olivero testified that
the nature of the assignment was "[do investigate the possibility of any criminal viola-
tions of the Internal Revenue Code." Id. at 2359.
" Id.
12 United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 37 A.F.T.R. 2d 76-1239, 76-1240
(N.D. 111. 1978).
I3 Id.
May 1979)	 CASENOTES	 743
proof in challenging the summonses by demonstrating that his activities were
directed solely at unearthing evidence of criminal conduct by Gattuso." On
this basis the court found no justification for the summonses under section
7602.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision." Using a clearly erroneous standard of
review," the circuit court maintained that despite Agent Olivero's testimony
suggesting a civil purpose for his investigation, the district court was justified
in finding that the investigation was designed solely to unearth evidence of
criminal conduct.' 7 In determining whether the district court's refusal to en-
force the summonses was correct, the circuit ,court turned first to the Su-
preme Court's decision of Donaldson v. United States," and subsequently, to a
review of the differing interpretations of the Donaldson standard which were
developed in the circuit courts." Relying particularly on the Ninth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Zack, 20 the circuit court concluded that if an IRS
' 4 Id. The district court judge explicitly commented on the lack of any evi-
dence showing that Olivero ever considered a civil investigation. In addition, after
refusing to allow respondents to examine the IRS investigative file, the court agreed to
an in camera inspection of the file commenting that if nothing was found to give more
weight to the Government position than Olivero's testimony did, it would conclude
"that he was at all times involved in a criminal investigation, at least in his own mind."
98 S. Ct. at 2631, The judge considered this dispositive of the issue at trial holding
that such a purpose precludes a finding of good faith as required by Donaldson v.
United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971). 37 A.F.T.R. 2d 76-1239, 76-1240 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
In accord see, e.g., United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1351-52 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Lafko, 520 F.2d 622, 624-25 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368,
374-75 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
15 554 F.2d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1977).
18 After concluding that the district court's finding of a criminal purpose was a
factual rather than a legal conclusion, the circuit court limited its review of the district
court's finding to the clearly erroneous standard as outlined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Id. at 305-06. The circuits have split on whether "criminal purpose" is a factual rather
than a legal finding. See, United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252
(7th Cir. 1972) (fact). But see, United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 460 (6th Cir.
1973) (either a mixed finding of fact and conclusion of law or a finding of ultimate
fact based on legal principles).
17 554 F.2d at 306. In response to a direct question by the district court, Oliv-
ero stated that he had not yet made a determination in his own mind whether to
recommend criminal prosecution. Id. at 304. After hearing testimony, however, the
court stated that nothing in Olivero's testimony suggested that the thought of a civil
investigation ever crossed his mind. Id. at 305.
18 400 U.S. 517 (1971). The case and the developments it effected are treated
in depth in a subsequent section. See text at note 78 infra. '
18 554 F.2d at 306-08.
20 521 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1975). The Ninth Circuit held that a summons
issued solely for a criminal purpose is not issued in good faith, despite the lack of a
recommendation for prosecution. Id. at 1368. See text at note 78 infra.
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summons was issued solely to elicit information for use in a criminal action, it
could not. be issued in good faith, even if a criminal prosecution had not yet
been reconnended.2 ' Indeed, the court characterized the use of a summons
solely for criminal purposes as a classic manifestation of bad faith. 22
 Thus,
since the district court's finding of sole criminal purpose was not clearly er-
roneous, the circuit court sustained its denial of enforcement."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "PAecause of the importance of
the issue in the enforcement of the internal revenue laws, and because of
conflict among the courts of appeals concerning the scope of IRS summons
authority under § 7602 ...." 21
 In a five to four decision, the Court reversed
the judgment of the court of appeals and HELD: Only the institutional pos-
ture of the IRS, and not the personal intent of an agent, is relevant in deter-
mining whether a summons is issued in pursuit of a civil tax determination or
solely for a criminal investigation." The Court also reaffirmed its prior hold-
ing22
 that Internal Revenue summonses are enforceable so long as they are
issued in good faith pursuit of a congressionally authorized purpose under
section 7602, and prior to a formal IRS recommendation for criminal pros-
ecution. 27 The latter requirement was clarified by the Court's statement that
such recommendation must be the formal one by the IRS to the Department
of Justice." Finally, contrary to the view of the district. court, the Court.
found that the party opposing enforcement of a summons bears the burden
of proving the absence of a valid civil tax determination or collection purpose
by the IRS rather than the burden of proving an improper purpose for is-
suance of the sumtnons. 29
justice Stewart., writing in dissent, argued that section 7602 does not.
expressly prohibit the use of' the summons power for solely criminal
ptirposes. 2° Consequently, he found the Court's analysis of purpose to be
irrelevant in ruling on the validity of a summons. Expressly adhering to
precedent stating that there arc but two limits on the enforcement of a
summons—it must be issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for
criminal prosecution'—the dissent would have reversed the lower courts
without remand.32
554 F.2d at 308-09.
22 Id. at 309.
23 Id.
24 98 S. Ct. at 2362.
25 Id. at 2367.
" See Donaldson, 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
27 98 S. Ct. at 2368.
" Id. at 2365-66 and n.15.
2" Id. at 2367. The Court found this approach necessary since the purpose of
the good faith inquiry is to determine whether the Service is honestly pursuing the
goals of § 7602 in issuing the summons. Id.
a" Id. at 2369. Justice Stewart was joined in his dissent by the Chief Justice,
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens.
31 ld. The dissent relied on Donaldson, supra note 18.
32 Id. at. 2370.
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The Supreme Court's decision in LaSalle National Bank is significant for
its procedural effect on the tax law enforcement process. This effect will be
most evident in determining whether a summons has been issued in good
faith pursuit of an authorized purpose under section 7602. Under LaSalle, the
intent of the IRS as an institution is now the proper focal point—supplanting
the intent of an individual agent. Furthermore, after LaSalle, a recommenda-
tion for criminal prosecution made during the IRS administrative processes
will no longer render the summons power under section 7602 void. Rather,
the Service now may continue to issue administrative summonses in good faith
until a formal recommendation for prosecution is made to the Department of
Justice. Lastly, a taxpayer challenging enforcement of a summons now faces
the heavy burden of disproving a valid civil purpose for its issuance, making
the task of quashing a summons exceedingly difficult.
This note will begin with an in–depth discussion of the Supreme Court's
analysis in LaSalle, followed by an historical investigation of this area of the
law to provide the background for a critical analysis of the Court's opinion. It
will then be submitted that the Court's standard, while appearing to be two-
pronged in nature, functions, as a practical matter, as a single spectral stan-
dard. Potential problems of implementation concerning the standard adopted
by the Court will be discussed. In this regard, it will be submitted that the
Court lost sight of the policies it was originally trying to protect. This note will
then conclude with a prediction of the probable ramifications of LaSalle.
I. THE ANALYSIS OF THE COURT
The statutory provisions of section 7602 provided the starting point for
the LaSalle Court's analysis. As an initial premise, the majority posited that
section 7602 limits the use of IRS summonses. The Service does not possess
the inherent authority to compel the production of the private papers of citi-
zens, the Court noted. Rather, the Service may exercise only the limited au-
thority affirmatively granted to it by Congress under section 7602. 33 Further,
section 7602 authorizes the use of the summons power for four purposes
only, none of which include sole criminal' investigation. 34 Therefore, the
summons power must be limited to prevent its use for sole criminal investiga-
tion purposes.
After concluding that a limitation on the summons power is inherent in
section 7602, the Court addressed the criteria to be considered in determining
33
 Id, at 2367 n.18. A careful reading of § 7602 reveals that Congress intended
the Service to utilize its summons authority only to aid in the determining and collect-
ing of taxes, which purposes "do not include the goal of filing criminal charges against
citizens." Id. This analysis clearly conflicts with the logic of the dissent in LaSalle. The
dissent would permit the use of an administrative summons for solely criminal pur-
poses on the ground that the statute contains no prohibition against such use. The
fallacy of this logic, as pointed out by the majority, results from the dissenting justices'
search for a prohibitive clause on the face of the statute rather than an affirmative
grant of such authority. Id.
34 Id., See note 5 supra.
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when the limitation must be imposed. In addressing this issue, the LaSalle
Court particularly noted the need to protect the grand jury's role in the crim-
inal justice system by avoiding the expansion of the Justice Departmeth's pow-
ers of criminal discovery through unrestricted use of the summons power. 39
Additionally, in recognizing that section 7602 is a statutory grant of power to
the IRS, the Court required that such power at all times be used in gobd faith
pursuit of the congressionally authorized purposes of section 7602. 3° While
listing several improper purposes, 37 as enumerated in United States v. Powell,"
the Court nevertheless noted that use of a summons with civil and possible
criminal liabilities is acceptable under section 7602. 39 The Court further
noted, however, that the Powell list of improper purposes was not meant to be
all inclusive," and has received one important addition from the circuit
courts—the issuance of a summons for a sole criminal purpose. 41 In accept-
ing this addition, the LaSalle Court stated that validating such a purpose
would expand the criminal discovery powers of the Department of . Justice
thereby infringing on the grand jury's role. Accordingly, the Court held that a
sole criminal purpose was an improper basis for issuing a section 7602 sum-
mons. 42
Having held that a sole criminal purpose acts to invalidate the summons
power under section 7602, the Court then undertook to define such a pur-
pose. In so doing, the Court ultimately focused on the institutional posture of
the IRS to determine the presence of a criminal investigatory purpose, and
not the personal motive of an agent. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
observed that since Congress has created a tax law enforcement system in
which civil and criminal elements are inherently intertwined, a special agent is
35 Id. at 2365.
36 Id. at 2368.
37 Id. at 2366.
38 379 U.S. 48 (1964). The Court in Powell stated that:
[The Service] must show that the investigation will be conducted pursuant
to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose,
that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's pos-
session, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have been
followed .... [A] court may not permit its process to be abused. Such an
abuse would take place if the summons had been issued for an improper
purpose, such as to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle
a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the
particular investigation.
Id. at 57-58 (emphasis added).
39
 98 S. Ct. at 2363. The willful submission of a fraudulent tax return can
carry not only criminal penalties but also a civil penalty of 50% of the underpayment.
1.R.C. § 6653(b). As the Court noted, then, in issuing a summons for one or all of the
purposes delineated in § 7602, the Service may examine for suspected tax fraud and
for determination of the civil penalty. The statute draws no distinction between the
civil and criminal aspects, as was noted in Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517,
535 (1971).
4°
 98 S. Ct. at 2368 n.19.
41 Id. at 2366. See cases enumerated at note 14 supra.
42 Id. at 2367 and n.18.
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authorized to issue a civil summons in aid of a tax investigation with both
civil, and possible criminal, consequences." The Court felt that the institu-
tional obligations of the Service under the Code, in preventing civil and crim-
inal violations of the tax laws, are not necessarily undermined by the motive
of a single agent in building a criminal case. 44 In particular, the Court ex-
pressed a fear that distinguishing between acceptable civil and unacceptable
criminal purposes on the basis of an agent's motivation would have two det-
rimental results. First, such a distinction would impose an unnecessary bur-
den on tax law enforcement by restricting the use of the summons power
based on an agent's motivation without considering the enforcement policy of
the Service in an institutional sense. 45 Second, it would act to delay enforce-
ment proceedings since a standard based on an agent's subjective intent in
issuing a summons would necessitate analyzing the agent's thought pro-
cesses. 46
 Thus, while seeking to avoid the evils inherent in issuing a summons
solely for a criminal purpose, the Court attempted to maintain the utility of
the summons process in investigating civil tax liability. 47 On this basis, the
Court concluded that the institutional posture of the IRS provides the best
yardstick by which to measure whether a summons was issued solely for a
criminal purpose. 48
The Court supported this conclusion with an analysis of the multi -layered
procedure which an investigation must follow before a decision to recommend
prosecution is reached." The Court gave great weight to the fact that offi-
cials of at least two layers of review must concur with the conclusion of a
special agent before a recommendation to the Department of Justice is made
and, thus, the criminal tangent can be dropped at any layer." That these
numerous reviews also afford a taxpayer substantial protection against a hasty,
erroneous judgment of a special agent further influenced the Court's decision
to focus on Service rather than agent intents'
43 Id. at 2363.
" Id. at 2366.
45 Id. at 2367.
46
 Id.
47 Id. at 2365-66 n.15.
48 Id. at 2367.
44 Id. at 2366-67. As the Court noted, the agent's final recommendation is
reviewed by the district chief of the Intelligence Division. The Office of Regional
Counsel also reviews a case before it is sent to the National Office of the Service or the
Department of Justice. In the event that the Regional Counsel and the Assistant Re-
gional Commissioner for Intelligence cannot reach an agreement concerning the dispo-
sition of a case, it is completely reviewed again at the national level by the Criminal Tax
Division of the Office of General Counsel. Therefore, since a recommendation to the
Department of Justice only occurs after officials of at least two layers have concurred
in the special agent's recommendation, his motivation was held not to be dispositive by
the Court. Id.
511 Id. at 2367.
51 Id. The taxpayer may obtain a conference with officials at the district Intel-
ligence Division either upon request or whenever the chief of the Division concludes
that the Government's best interests would be served by such a conference. If prosecu-
tion has been recommended and the case referred to Regional Counsel, the chief so
notifies the taxpayer. Id.
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The LaSalle Court further set forth an objective standard for determining
when the Service has acted with an improper criminal purpose. 52 In this
regard, the Court pinpointed an IRS recommendation to prosecute a taxpayer
as the triggering event. As previously held by the Court in Donaldson," the
point of recommendation objectively manifests the Service's intent to prose-
cute.54
 Accordingly, the LaSalle Court maintained that issuance of a sum-
mons after that point would likely be to gather additional evidence for use in
the criminal proceeding. The collection of such evidence clearly would consti-
tute an unwarranted expansion of criminal discovery rights. In limiting the
summons power at the time of a prosecution recommendation, the LaSalle
Court attempted to clarify its prior holding in Donaldson—that a summons
issued after a recommendation for prosecution was invalid—by stating that
the dispositive recommendation is the Service's formal one to the Department
of Justice."
While emphasizing that the IRS must at all times use its summons power
in good faith, the LaSalle Court supported retaining the formal recommenda-
tion as the latest time for the valid use of a section 7602 summons on several
grounds. In particular, the Court noted that, upon referral to the Department
of Justice, the IRS loses the authority to settle by compromising the civil and
criminal aspects of a tax fraud case. 56 From then on, the Justice Department
has the sole authority to effect such a settlements' In this regard, it is ex-
pected that the two agencies will cooperate in the civil case thereby encourag-
ing efficient settlement of the dispute." As the Court pointed out, however,
the inherently intertwined nature of the civil and criminal aspects make it
ludicrous to expect a "partial information barrier" to exist. Consequently, the
restraint on the IRS summons authority, after a final recommendation, en-
courages cooperation while minimizing the potential for abuse of authority."
52 Id. at 2365.
" 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
" Id. at 536.
55
 98 S. Ct. at 2365 n.15, 2368. This part of the holding is important in ex-
plaining the Court's language in Donaldson which stated that a summons "may be issued
in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation
for criminal prosecution." 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971). This language prompted an ap-
pellate watershed as to which recommendation the Court was referring to, i.e.. one
within the Service's investigative process, or the final one to the Department of Justice.
For opinions following the former approach, see United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d
928 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Lafko, 520 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1975); United States
v. Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For opinions in accord with the latter
approach, see United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Theodore, 479
F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Billingsley, 469 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1972).
" 98 S. Ct. at 2365.
s7
55 Id.
" Id.
May 1979)	 CASENOTES	 749
In summary, a recommendation for prosecution to the Department of
Justice offers a concise objective standard for determining when a section
7602 summons is issued for an invalid purpose. It is when this objective stan-
dard is not available—at any point prior to such recommendationthat the
LaSalle decision becomes crucial in determining whether the summons power
was exercised in good faith, and therefore, is valid. Under the LaSalle Court's
reasoning, a sole criminal purpose in serving a summons constitutes one
major example of bad faith. And to discern sole criminal purpose, one must
look to the institutional posture of the IRS.
II. HISTORY
Much of the confusion potentially resulting from LaSalle has precedent in
the prior case law interpeting the proper standard for enforcing a summons
issued pursuant to section 7602. Past Supreme Court decisions in this area
have vaguely defined the limits on the summons power." This vagueness
resulted in numerous conflicting circuit court decisions." The LaSalle Court,
in recognition of the conflicts in this area," viewed its decision as an effort to
impose a degree of clarity on the confusion in the circuits. Consequently, a
discussion of the problems leading up to LaSalle will provide a background
for better understanding the Court's decision.
In the 1971 decision of Donaldson v. United States," the Supreme Court
attempted to clarify the intended scope of the statutory grant of summons
power under section 7602, and the proper standard for use of the power. In
that case, the Court discussed dictum from its earlier decision in Reisman v.
Caplin" to the effect that issuance of a summons to obtain evidence for use in
a criminal prosecution constituted an improper purpose under section
7602. 65
 The Donaldson Court, while considering the analysis and the cir-
cumstances involved in Reisman," indicated that this dictum was applicable to
" Donaldson, 400 U.S. 517 (1971); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
61
 See cases cited in note 55 supra.
62 See 98 S. Ct. at 2362 and n.6.
62
 Sec note 18 supra.
" 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
65 Id. at 449. The passage referred to reads:
[T]he witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground.
This would include, as the circuits have held, the defenses that the material
is sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a crim-
inal prosecution, Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 772-773 ....
66 Petitioners in Reisman were seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to in-
validate IRS summonses issued pursuant to § 7602. 375 U.S. at 444. The Court, how-
ever, discussed the ability of petitioners to challenge the summonses on proper
grounds at an enforcement hearing, using sole criminal purpose as an example of a
proper ground. Id. at 446-50. Holding the remedy at law—an enforcement hearing—
to be adequate, the Court denied the relief sought. Id. at 450.
In addition to these circumstances, the Donaldson Court noted that the Reisman
dictum itself, see note 65 supra, embraces a citation to Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767
(9th Cir. 1956), 400 U.S. at 533. Boren was an opinion in which the Ninth Circuit
carefully distinguished United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953), a
750	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 20:741
the issuance of a summons during a pending criminal charge or, at most,
during an investigation solely for criminal purposes. 67 The last paragraph of
Donaldson, however, suggested a different interpretation of section 7602 in
stating: "We hold that under § 7602 an internal revenue summons may be
issued in aid of an investigation if it is issued in good faith and prior to a
recommendation for criminal prosection." 68
 Consequently, after Donaldson, it
was far from clear whether a summons issued pursuant to section 7602 was
invalid only when issued solely for a criminal purpose, as stated in the Reisman
dictum, or whether the good faith langauge of the last paragraph in Donaldson
supposed additional considerations for holding a summons invalid.
The vagueness and ambiguity of the holding in Donaldson resulted in con-
flicting decisions among the circuits attempting to apply the Donaldson stan-
dard." The final paragraph of Donaldson apparently set forth a two-pronged
standard requiring both good faith and the absence of a recommendation for
prosecution before a section 7602 summons would be enforceable." Various
circuits nevertheless have focused solely on whether a recommendation for
prosecution has been made to determine the enforceability of an IRS sum-
mons. 71 While such an approach has garnered limited judicial acceptance,"
most recent cases have considered the good faith language in the last para-
graph of Donaldson as an additional consideration regarding validity."
This new trend, in focusing on good faith, itself engendered a con-
troversy as to which language constituted holding in Donaldson and which was
dictum. A number of circuits have held that the last paragraph of the
decision—relating to the good faith and prior recommendation
requirements—was technically dictum." These courts instead regarded the
case where the taxpayer was already under indictment. The Donaldson Court therefore
concluded that the Reisman dictum was to he read in light of its citation to Boren, and
of Boren's own citation to O'Connor, which would give such dictum its proper focus in
bearing on sole criminal investigations. 400 U.S. at 533.
67
 400 U.S. at 533.
" 8 Id. at 536.
6" The facts in Donaldson led to a broad interpretive split in the various cir-
cuits. The only issue before the Court was whether Donaldson had sufficient interest
to intervene in a proceeding to enforce a § 7602 summons issued to a third party to
produce records of Donaldson's employment and compensation for the years under
investigation. After affirming the lower court's decision denying intervention, the
Court went on to discuss the proper standard for enforcing an administrativ6 sum-
mons thereby causing some circuits to regard all or part of the latter sections of the
opinion as mere dicta. See the cases at note 74 infra.
7" 400 U.S. at 536.
7 ' See, e.g., United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir.
1972).
72 See, e.g., United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir.
1972). But see, United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 460 (6th Cir. 1973).
73
 United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 554 F.2d 302, 306 (7th Cir. 1977).
74
 United States v. Lafko, 520 F.2d 622, 625 n.5 (3d Cir. 1975); United States
v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 374 n.7 (3rd Cir. 1975); United States v. Weingarden, 473
F.2d 454, 460 (6th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 932
(3d Cir. 1976).
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holding of Donaldson as the paragraph quoting the Reisman dictum. On this
basis, these circuits ruled that the proper standard for determining the valid-
ity of a summons must focus on whether the summons was issued to obtain
evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. In applying this standard, these
courts considered whether the sole purpose of an agent in issuing the sum-
mons was criminal in nature.
In contrast, certain circuit courts have regarded the last paragraph of
Donaldson as constituting the holding in that case.' Under this view, courts
have held that a summons must be issued prior to a recommendation of pros-
ecution. Additionally, even when issued prior to such a recommendation,
these circuits have required that a summons be issued in good faith. In this
regard, these courts have viewed an agent's intent to recommend prosecution
as reflecting bad faith in issuing a summons, even though his sole purpose
was not criminal in nature. 7 °
Finally, still another group of circuit courts have declined to follow the
established pattern of dichotomizing Donaldson's language between holding
and dictum by promulgating an additional set of rules for evaluating section
7602 summonses. These rules consist of the Third Circuit's delineation of a
list of factors which would allow enforcement, 77 and the Ninth Circuit's in-
terrelation of the good faith inquiry with the sole criminal purpose issue."
In deciding the sole criminal purpose issue, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a
summons issued solely for a criminal purpose is not issued in good faith,
despite the lack of a recommendation for prosecution."
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in LaSalle traced much of this in-
terpretive history and concluded that in regard to Donaldson, it should "take at
face value the words of the authoring Justice and characterize the final para-
graph of the opinion for the Court as constituting a holding of Donaldson." 8°
" See, e.g., United States v. Wall Corporation, 475 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
" In purposely attempting to avoid distinguishing the holding in Donaldson
from its supposed dictum, the Third Circuit articulated various principles from several
relevant cases in holding that possible criminal, in addition to civil, liability will not
prevent enforcement if: (I) the Intelligence Division has not yet recotnmended pros-
ecution, (2) the agent has not already formed a firm purpose to recommend prosecu-
tion, (3) the summons is not being used to harass the taxpayer, and (4) the material
referred to in the summons has not already been inspected by the Government.
United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 932 (3d Cir. 1976). This approach noticeably
avoidk the use of the words "good faith," using instead a list of circumstances where
denial of enforcement is proper. This is similar to the approach of United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). See note 38 supra.
78 The Ninth Circuit attempted to reconcile the conflicting language of
Donaldson by harmonizing the good faith requirement with the "solely for criminal
purposes" consideration. It therefore held that even prior to a recommendation for
criminal prosecution, a summons could not be enforced if it was issued in bad faith,
which would include using an administrative summons solely for criminal prosecution
purposes. United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1975). Accord, see cases
at note 14 supra.
" United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1975).
" United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 554 F.2d 302, 308 (7th Cir. 1977).
The court regarded the last paragraph as an "alternative holding." Id. at 308 n.4.
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Defining the issue in LaSalle as "whether the Internal Revenue Service may
issue a summons solely in aid of a criminal investigation and still meet the
standard of good faith as enunciated in Donaldson," 81 the appellate court de-
nied enforcement of the summons. In so doing, the court noted that it found
the Ninth Circuit's reconcilation of the various Donaldson statements a persua-
sive delineation of what the Supreme Court has held. 82
In granting certiorari against this background, the Supreme Court recog-
nized a need for a clarification of Donaldson. 83 The Court expressed its task
in terms of examining the limits of the good faith use of an Internal Revenue
summons issued under section 7602, 84 thereby implying that the "recommen-
dation for prosecution" standard was not the sole consideration in determin-
ing the validity of a section 7602 summons. It added that the Service must at
all times use the summons power in good faith pursuit of the Congressionally
authorized purposes of section 7602. 85 Thus, the Court agreed with the
LaSalle circuit court and those courts which viewed the final paragraph of
Donaldson as stating the holding in that case. Similarly, as did the appeals
court, the Supreme Court adopted the Ninth Circuit's premise that the good
faith issue properly relates to the concept of sole criminal purpose. The issue
in the LaSalle case itself thus became whether a finding that a special agent is
conducting an investigation for the sole purpose of unearthing evidence of
criminal conduct necessarily leads to the conclusion that section 7602 sum-
monses issued by the agent were not issued in good faith." By focusing on
the institutional posture of the IRS as determining whether such a sole crimi-
nal purpose exists, the Court answered in the negative.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
While the first sentence of LaSalle implies an objective of explaining
Donaldson and laying to rest the conflicting outgrowths of that case, 87 it is
questionable whether tranquility will descend over this area of the law. In-
deed, the LaSalle Court's approach carries the potential for creating additional
problems in this area. By inadequately defining sole criminal purpose, and
determining its existence on the basis of institutional posture, the LaSalle deci-
sion may engender as much vagueness as did the Donaldson decision. In addi-
tion, by identifying the objective recommendation for prosecution aspect of its
8
81 Id, at 308-09.
" Id. at 309.
83 See 98 S. Ct. 2357, 2359, 2365 n.15. See also note 87 infra.
84 Id. at 2363.
" Id, at 2368.
88 Id. at 2363. This did not evolve into the identical issue ruled on below. At
the trial and appellate levels, the question was whether the "criminal purpose" issue
was relevant to the "good faith" inquiry. The Supreme Court, however, ruled on the
definition of "criminal purpose," i.e., whether or not it should be defined in regard to
the agent's motive or the institutional motive of the IRS, taking the relevance as given.
87
 The first sentence reads, "This case is a supplement to our decision in
Donaldson u. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971)." 98 S. Ct. at 2359.
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standard with the formal. IRS recommendation to the Justice Department, the
LaSalle Court may have created a standard which will fail to guard the very
interest the Court labored to protect—the grand jury's role in the prosecution
of criminal conduct. To further develop these consequences, an in-depth dis-
cussion of the mechanics and the problems of the LaSalle Court's standard will
be undertaken.
A. THE SPECTRAL STANDARD THEORY
In LaSalle, the Supreme Court attempted to define and distinguish the
good faith, sole criminal purpose, and recommendation for prosecution ele-
ments of a tax investigation as they relate to the enforceability of section 7602
summonses. Adding substances to these terms, the Court set forth a two-
pronged test for IRS summons enforcement. 88 As a result, in determining
whether a summons is valid courts must concern themselves with two basic
questions. First, it must be determined if the summons was issued prior to a
formal recommendation by the IRS to the Justice Department that a criminal
prosecution be commenced. A negative response to this question would in-
validate the summons. If, however, the summons were issued prior to such a
recommendation, it must then be determined if the IRS was acting at all times
in good faith pursuit of a congressionally authorized purpose under section
7602.
It is submitted that the two–prong standard which emerged from the
Court's decision operates as a single spectral standard. The Court states that
the use of section 7602 must be at all times in good faith." This good faith
requirement therefore can be read as encompassing the recommendation for
prosecution element of the standard. Consequently, the single standard for
determining the validity of an IRS summons is good faith, evidence of which
includes whether a recommendation for prosecution was made prior to issu-
ing the summons. To conceptualize this analysis a spectrum is useful. On the
extreme right of the spectrum is an irrebuttable presumption of bad faith,
created at the point of a case's referral to the Justice Department for criminal
prosecution. Prior to that point, a presumption of IRS good faith exists, con-
cerning the issuance of a summons, which a taxpayer can rebut by proving
the absence of a valid civil purpose for using section 7602. However, with the
main concern always focused on the intent of the IRS, and where such
intent lies on this spectrum, success in challenging an IRS summons will be
exceptionally difficult to achieve for the reasons discussed in the following
sections.
B. PROBLEMS OF VAGUENESS
1. Sole Criminal Purpose
The vagueness of the sole criminal purpose concept may make the appli-
cation of the Court's standard exceedingly difficult at best. The conclusion
88 Id. at 2368.
89 Id.
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that sole criminal purpose is a classic example of bad faith is inherently prob-
lematic since the Court failed to clearly define the indicia of such a purpose.
Additionally, in view of some of the Court's own statements, 9° it may be ir-
relevant whether institutional posture or agent motive is used to determine
the existence of a sole criminal purpose.
To understand the problem, the conflict between the concepts of possible
civil liability and sole criminal purpose must be satisfactorily harmonized. Un-
less this can be achieved, the application of the LaSalle standard will not only
be exceedingly difficult, but impossible to effect for if an agent's investigation
always holds a possibility of civil liability, it would defy logic to discern a sole
criminal purpose. In this regard, it should be noted that the LaSalle Court, in
discussing the sole criminal purpose aspect of the standard, held that to show
such a purpose a taxpayer must prove the absence of a valid civil tax deter-
mination or collection purpose by the IRS." The Court observed that the
government does not sacrifice its interest in unpaid taxes merely because a
criminal investigation is begun. 92
 Additionally, conviction on a criminal
charge automatically subjects a taxpayer to civil liability. 93
 If an investigation
fails to reveal an intent to defraud, but it is shown that an underpayment
resulted from a negligent or intentional disregard of the tax rules, the Code
provides for a civil monetary penalty. 94
 Therefore, any IRS investigation
culminating in a successful Government suit, results in civil liability, while
some investigations reveal unlawful conduct severe enough to warrant crimi-
nal liability in addition to civil liability.
Since any successful investigation may lead to civil liability, it will be
difficult—if not impossible—to discover an investigation being conducted
with a sole criminal purpose. The Government always retains the purpose of
collecting the civil penalty. Further, to show a sole criminal purpose, a tax-
payer must prove the absence of a valid civil determination or collection pur-
pose by the Service which, as the Court itself proclaimed, is a heavy bur-
den. 95
 The Court's failure to provide an insight into evidence relevant in
disproving a valid civil purpose has the additional potential for creating seri-
ous implementation problems. Thus, while a sole purpose renders a section
7602 summons invalid under LaSalle, the Court, in its vague treatment of the
issue may have left proof of such a purpose beyond reach.
2. Institutional Posture
Assuming that the conflicting concepts of possible civil liability and sole
criminal purpose can be satisfactorily harmonized, thereby making it possible
99 See, e.g., Id. at 2367 where the Court, in discussing the burden of proof it
has placed on a challenging party, calls it "a heavy one" and goes on to say, "[b]ecause
criminal and civil fraud liabilities are coterminous, the Service rarely will be found to
have acted in bad faith by pursuing the former."
Id. See note 29 supra.
92 Id, at 2365.
93
 I.R.C. § 6653(b).
94
 I.R.C. § 6653(a).
95
 98 S. Ct. at 2367. See note 90 supra.
May 1979)	 CASENOTES	 755
to discern a sole criminal purpose, the decision of the Court to focus on the
Service's institutional posture in discerning such a purpose raises additional
problems. Although ascertaining the motive of a single agent would appear
easier than ascertaining that of the IRS as an institution, the LaSalle Court
maintained at an agent's personal intent is inadequate evidence for determin-
ing sole criminal purpose. In the Court's view, the use of such evidence
"would delay summons enforcement proceedings while parties clash over, and
judges grapple with, the thought processes of each investigator." 96
On this basis the Court considered it undesirable to create a standard
which would require proving an individual agent's intent. This conclusion,
however, raises two apparent inconsistencies in the Court's apprehension that
thought-process analysis would delay summons enforcement proceedings.
First, the Court admits that there will be times when an agent's motive is
relevant to the question of the validity of a summons." For example, under
the good faith standards enunciated in United States v. Powell," such motive
may be at issue in determining if a summons was served to harass a taxpayer.
Consequently, in any enforcement proceeding where the taxpayer asserts a
violation of the good faith requirements of Powell the mindreading of an
agent will still be necessary.
The second inconsistency in the Court's concern with evaluating an indi-
vidual agent's motive is reflected in the very standard adopted in place of an
agent's motive. Instead of ascertaining and proving the intent of an agent, a
taxpayer must now ascertain and prove the intent of the IRS as an institution.
The Court's failure to indicate what sort of evidence is required in proving
institutional intent may well result in problems in implementing this standard
thereby delaying summons enforcement proceedings—the result which the
Court sought to avoid. And, contrary to the Court's desire to clarify, this fail-
ure may create the same diversity among the circuits as did the vague lan-
guage of Donaldson.
In one decision which has dealt with the Service's institutional intent since
LaSalle, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit added
cause for concern regarding this standard. In United States v. Marine Midland
Bank of New York, 99 the Second Circuit held that both the point to which a
recommendation for prosecution has progressed through the Service's
decision-making levels, and the extent to which civil collection efforts are con-
tinuing at the time of a challenge to a summons are proper evidence for
determining institutional posture. Several analytical difficulties may arise
under this approach. If such evidence may be used to determine its posture,
the Service on the one hand could slow the speed with which a recommenda-
tion passes through its machinery, while, on the other hand, maintaining a
facade of civil collection in order to avoid the quashing of a summons.
96 Id.
97 U. at 2367 n.17.
98
 See note 38 supra.
99 585 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978).
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The probability of such occurrences may have been increased by the Sec-
ond Circuit's conclusion that the IRS is in the better position to provide the
information as to its own institutional posture.'°° The court stated that en-
forcement delays and litigation could best be avoided by the Service's prompt
and full disclosure of both the point to which prosecution recommendations
have progressed, as well as the extent to which civil collection efforts are still
being pursued.'" However, the court stated that an IRS affidavit would suf-
fice to disclose this information and that no full-dress discovery or trial would
be necessary. 102 Thus, the Second Circuit, as did the Supreme Court, may
have left the proof of a sole criminal purpose beyond reach.
C. FAILURE TO PROTECT STATED POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The standard articulated by the LaSalle Court and some of the statements
surrounding its expression indicate that the Court may have lost sight of the
policy interests it claimed it was attempting to protect. 1°3 In declaring that
the institutional posture of the IRS, and not the motive of an agent, controls
in determining sole criminal purpose, and in identifying an objective en-
forcement standard with the formal recommendation of prosecution to the
Department of Justice, the Court has failed to eliminate the potential for in-
fringing on the role of the grand jury by expanding the criminal discovery
powers of the Justice Department. Indeed, both elements of the LaSalle stan-
dard are ineffective in curtailing the summons power before a large mass of
criminal evidence has been accumulated. The vagueness of the sole criminal
purpose standard may infringe on the grand jury's role since the inability of
taxpayers to introduce sufficient evidence to show such a purpose—by prov-
ing the absence of a valid civil purpose—will cause fewer summonses to be
quashed. The recommendation for prosecution aspect of the standard may
prove equally unsatisfactory. Although the act of recommending prosecution
to the Department of Justice provides a clear, concise, objective standard for
determining if an IRS summons is invalid, the triggering of this standard is
very late in the investigative chain. 10" This late triggering, in allowing the
accumulation of excessive criminal evidence, maintains the potential for in-
fringing on the grand jury's role thereby expanding the criminal discovery
powers of the Department of Justice.
In stating its reasoning, the Court explained that the intent of a single
agent—both in determining sole criminal purpose or in quashing a summons
when he recommends prosecution to his superiors—should not control the
100 Id. at 38.
101 Id. at 38-39.
102 Id. at 39.
' 03 See 98 S. Ct. at 2366.
Those policy interests are reflected in the Court's statement that § 7602
cannot be read so as to broaden the "Justice Department's right of criminal
litigation discovery or to infringe on the role of the grand jury as the prin-
cipal tool of criminal accusation." Id. at 2365.
'" See note 103 supra.
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validity of a summons since a recommendation must travel through several
levels within the institutional structure of the IRS. Since two such levels must
agree to recommend prosecution before the Department of Justice is notified,
the criminal tangent can be dropped at any time.'" The Court apparently
relied on this procedure as a safeguard on the summons power. Such re-
liance, however, is misplaced. Since an agent must convince two higher levels
of decision makers that his decision to recommend criminal prosecution is
justified, he is likely to amass as much evidence in support of that opinion as
is possible. All such evidence is subsequently turned over to the Department
of Justice upon a recommendation of prosecution. Consequently, this element
of the standard may create a situation which allows an accumulation of evi-
dence by the Service to a degree inconsistent with the policy interests which
the Court stated it was trying to protect—preventing an unwarranted expan-
sion of the criminal discovery powers.
The Court explicitly recognized the potential danger created by these
elements of its standard by stating, "[w]e shall not countenance delay in sub-
mitting a recommendation to the Justice Department when there is an institu-
tional commitment to make the referral and the Service merely would like to
gather additional evidence for the prosecution."'" These cautionary words
of the Court fall short of their goal, however, since the Service will not have
to delay recommendation in order to gather more evidence. The agent al-
ready will have had ample opportunity to accumulate evidence sufficient to
convince two higher levels of authority to recommend prosecution. This op-
portunity is a direct result of the imposition of the objective standard so late
in an investigation, while prior to that point, the taxpayer faces the almost
impossible burden of proving institutional intent. As a result, the validity of
summonses issued pursuant to section 7602 is virtually ensured until a final
recommendation for prosecution is made to the Justice Department. The
Court expressly acknowledged "that the potential for expanding the criminal
discovery rights of the Justice Department or for usurping the role of the
grand jury exists at the point of the recommendation by the special agent" to
his superiors.'" Nonetheless, it refused to impose a restriction on the use of
the summons power at this earlier point in the investigative process.
Several potentially adverse results thus are apparent in the LaSalle Court's
opinion. The use of a sole criminal purpose test of good faith and the focus
on institutional posture create problems of vagueness which make it more
difficult to successfully quash a summons thereby endangering the grand
"5 See note 49 supra. In discussing this issue the Court says, "[a]t any of the
various stages, the Service can abandon the criminal prosecution, can decide instead to
assert a civil penalty, or can pursue both goals." 98 S. Ct. at 2367. This sentence seems
to make little sense since abandoning the criminal prosecution is a decision to instead
assert a civil penalty—which, as was discussed, remains present throughout any inves-
tigation. The sentence should list the choices as, abandoning the entire investigation,
abandoning the criminal prosecution, or pursuing both goals.
100 98 S. Ct. at 2367-68.
107 Id. at 2365-66 n.15.
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jury's role. The use of the formal recommendation to the Department of Jus-
tice as the point for invalidating a summons also endangers the grand jury's
role. This result derives from the greatly increased proof burdens on tax-
payers seeking to quash section 7602 summonses. Absent a formal recom-
mendation for prosecution, such taxpayers must show the Service's sole crimi-
nal purpose by proving the absence of a valid civil purpose. Yet one court has
viewed an affidavit attesting to a civil purpose as adequate evidence on this
issue—an affidavit prepared by the IRS. Insofar as these proof problems
prove insurmountable in many cases, taxpayers will fail in quashing many
summonses. Such failures will in turn allow the Service to accumulate evi-
dence potentially available in criminal suits in derogation of the grand jury's
role in the criminal sphere.
These criticisms of the Court's primary and secondary reasons for adopt-
ing its standard lead to the prediction that the LaSalle decision will cause con-
fusion among the circuits. As a result of the Supreme Court's silence on the
issue, the courts are free to decide what evidence will be required to prove the
absence of a valid civil collection purpose on the part of the IRS. The re-
sponse of the Second Circuit—requiring only an IRS affidavit—illustrates
one potentially harmful result. Other circuits may go too far in the other
direction by requiring the IRS to produce excessive amounts of evidence of a
civil purpose. In any case, LaSalle is likely to engender as much conflict as the
Donaldson decision, thereby creating new uncertainties in the enforcement of
section 7602 summonses.
CONCLUSION
In an attempt to recognize and settle the problems engendered by the 1971
case of Donaldson v. United States, and thereby to set forth a clear usable stan-
dard for ruling on the validity of section 7602 summonses, the Supreme
Court decided United States v. LaSalle National Bank. The Court clarified the
issue raised by Donaldson by holding that the summons power under section
7602 must be used in good faith and prior to a recommendation for prosecu-
tion to the Department of Justice. In so doing, the LaSalle Court narrowed
the protections afforded taxpayers for quashing IRS summonses under the
Code. No longer may the personal motive of a special agent in building a
criminal case be considered in assessing whether good faith was present in
issuing a summons. Instead, the institutional posture of the IRS must be
evaluated in deciding if the taxpayer has carried his burden of proving the
absence of a valid civil collection purpose. It is uncontested that this task is
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. The Court could have tempered this
result by providing an insight into relevant evidence rather than leaving the
matter to the circuit courts. Furthermore, following LaSalle, a recommenda-
tion for prosecution at any point in the Service's multi-level decision making
process will not render a summons invalid. Now, a taxpayer must wait until a
formal IRS recommendation for prosecution is made to the Department of
Justice before successfully challenging the issuance of a summons. The delay
inherent in this procedure may result in the Government's acquiring much
criminal evidence via a civil summons.
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It will take time to discern the true results of LaSalle. Inevitably, there will
be situations where, although a formal recommendation for prosecution has
not yet been made, the Service has in fact abandoned a valid civil purpose. If,
when these situations arise, however, it is not readily possible to acquire
adequate evidence of their existence, the good faith presumption on the part
of the IRS prior to a recommendation for prosecution will become irrebutt-
able as a practical matter. Thus, the effect of LaSalle is to resolve the dispute
concerning summons enforcibility by tipping the balance in favor of the IRS.
As a result, it remains to be seen whether the problems apparent in this area
of the law have been settled or merely replaced.
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